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“The story of our relationship to the earth is written more 
truthfully on the land than on the page. It lasts there. The land 
remembers what we said and what we did.” 
 –Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass 341 (Milk-
weed 2013) 
 
 “The land and the wealth that began in it still carry the shape 
of history. . . . The land remembers.  
 But what do we remember of it? Every political contest over 
claims on the land is, in part, a contest over what will be remem-
bered and what will be forgotten.” 
 –Jedediah Purdy, This Land Is Our Land: The Struggle for a 
New Commonwealth xvii (Princeton 2019) 
INTRODUCTION: HISTORY, ERASURE, AND THE LAW 
In asserting that “this land is our land” in his new book by 
that title,1 Professor Jedediah Purdy hopes to craft a narrative of 
possibility and common plight that can serve as a banner high 
and wide enough for all to unite beneath. The task he undertakes 
in this meditative collection of essays, written in a colloquial and 
often poetic tone, is no less than to sketch out a “horizon to aim 
for”—for all to aim for—a vision of the future to guide the kind of 
legal, social, and political change he wishes to see.2 What Purdy 
imagines is unabashedly idealistic and unapologetically above the 
 
 † Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Many thanks to 
Amna Akbar, Maggie Blackhawk, Guy Charles, Sheila Foster, Aziz Rana, Justin Simard, 
Madhavi Sunder, and Gerald Torres for helpful feedback on this piece. I am also grateful 
to Thanh Nguyen, Tammy Tran, Taylor Ridley, and Rikisha Collins for invaluable re-
search assistance, and to the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for all their 
thoughtful work preparing this piece for publication. 
 1 Jedediah Purdy, This Land Is Our Land: The Struggle for a New Commonwealth 
(Princeton 2019). 
 2 Id at 3. 
1978 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1977 
 
world of concrete prescription: he dreams of “an economy that 
prizes the work of sustaining and renewing the human world,”3 a 
society in which institutions would support “the flourishing of 
everyone and everything would sustain the flourishing of each 
person.”4 To reach that horizon, he emphasizes throughout that 
we must overcome our conflicts and divisions and prioritize that 
shared vision of the future: we must reach “answers that people 
can live by together.”5 For Purdy, the land is a metaphoric re-
source, a keeper of history, and the literal ground of our common 
condition. In those capacities, it helps him underscore that, for 
better or worse, we are all here, to flourish or perish together. 
In this book, which he pitches to a popular audience, Purdy 
turns to the land as a means of reorienting a divided American 
public toward more communitarian values and norms. In doing 
so, he follows in the footsteps of such introspective environmen-
talists as Henry David Thoreau and Wendell Berry, and, like 
them, anchors his hopeful imaginations in a critique, made all the 
more urgent by the looming threat of climate disaster, of the dire 
inequality and degradation of all forms of life that dominant cap-
italist modes of production and exchange have wrought. As he 
builds his historical narrative of how we arrived at this point, 
Purdy also describes the inequalities and racial violence of the 
present as legacies of colonization and slavery; and he explains 
that these largely “forgotten” histories6 nevertheless have deter-
mined the shape of the landscape, the infrastructure, and the dy-
namics of our interactions in the present. In this way, Purdy ex-
plicitly directs his message at everyone who belongs to this 
fractured populace, to call them into concerted action. This ambi-
tious project attempts to provide universal answers to some of the 
most critical yet seemingly insoluble questions of our times: How 
can we cultivate communication across our differences that will 
make it possible to work together in the face of existential threats 
to our collective survival? How can we learn to understand one 
another when the tremendously violent histories that sowed the 
terrain of conflict today have been suppressed for so long and in 
so many ways, such that we lack the information to know where 
others, and perhaps where we, ourselves, are coming from? 
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This Book Review reflects on the importance of the questions 
that Purdy presents, especially for the legal academy, as well as 
the shortcomings of his own engagement with them. Purdy 
rightly calls for a reframing of our collective relationship to the 
land and each other. Furthermore, he understands that recogniz-
ing the histories of conquest and slavery and their erasure is crit-
ical to any project that aims to unify a deeply divided public. Fore-
grounding this problem simultaneously invites and creates space 
for a difficult but necessary set of conversations about our differ-
ences, our divergent perspectives, and the ways those histories 
have shaped both. This choice is all the more commendable be-
cause it is relatively unusual in legal scholarship; underlining 
suppressed historical foundations is especially rare when the fo-
cus of a work, like this book, is not itself to engage in the task of 
recovering these histories. However, Purdy’s invocation of these 
histories raises more questions than he answers about their con-
nection to the stories, ideas, and experiences he shares in the rest 
of the book. Further, though the book poses questions about the 
significance of these histories and the problem of erasure that are 
especially salient for the legal academy, it does not appear con-
scious of what these histories can tell us about the law and legal 
institutions, nor of the specific dimensions of what doing this kind 
of work entails. 
By prioritizing these histories in his work nonetheless, 
Purdy’s goal appears to be to raise up the concerns of broad and 
diverse social movements and to bring them into the fold of his 
own communitarian vision. His choice to highlight these ques-
tions feels deliberately resonant with broader messages from 
global political movements of the moment. These movements, 
chiefly led by youth, have popularized a range of critiques of cap-
italist markets, their devastation of the environment, and the in-
tertwined histories of colonization and growth of the Atlantic 
slave trade out of which those markets arose.7 Over the last dec-
ade, and at an intensifying pace, public awareness of these histo-
ries has burgeoned, spurred by broadly publicized police and 
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military brutality and worldwide demonstrations following the 
police murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, protest 
movements in Ferguson and in Standing Rock, activist organiza-
tions like Black Lives Matter and Idle No More, and landmark 
commentaries from Michelle Alexander and Ta-Nehisi Coates.8 
Indeed, in “The Case for Reparations,” Coates laid confronting the 
history of slavery and its aftermath down as a gauntlet for the 
future, writing: “We cannot escape our history. All of our solutions 
to the great problems of health care, education, housing, and eco-
nomic inequality are troubled by what must go unspoken.”9 
This rising public engagement with the past has fostered the 
dismantling of more and more Confederate monuments, statues, 
and plaques;10 the end of Santa Fe’s Entrada pageant celebrating 
conquest;11 the growing replacement of Columbus Day with In-
digenous People’s Day12 and observation of a National Day of 
Mourning on Thanksgiving;13 the renaming of residential commu-
nity names14 and the revision of university seals,15 state flags, 
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school mascots,16 and professional sports teams’ names;17 Indige-
nous mapping projects;18 a congressional hearing on reparations19 
and the creation of university reparations funds;20 new media pro-
jects;21 and increasing recognition of Indigenous and Black strug-
gles across the country and worldwide.22 The growing public con-
versation has also increasingly knit itself to and raised the profile 
of historical scholarship that examines the ways that conquest 
and slavery shaped, for example, insurance systems,23 foreclo-
sure,24 credit markets,25 investment banking,26 and accounting 
practices.27 Last year, the launch of the New York Times’s 
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landmark 1619 Project ignited a cacophony of granular debates 
about the history of slavery across the Twitterverse. Its pieces ex-
plored the legacy of the slave trade in, among other things, the 
evolution of American capitalist market practices and the racial 
wealth gap, carceral and medical practices and institutions, cul-
ture and its appropriations, and democracy itself.28 
In foregrounding these long-buried histories in his book, 
which was published just one month after the 1619 Project’s in-
augural issue, Purdy both signals solidarity with these move-
ments and presents the problem of historical erasure to legal 
scholars. However, by breaking new ground, these movements 
have also made clear how unaccustomed the nation still is to deal-
ing with the racial, legally constructed violence of its present and 
past. The challenge of building productive dialogue on these issues 
continues to plague political movements and institutions, espe-
cially the broadly construed Left—for which Purdy speaks as a 
thought leader—and the legal academy, of which he is an estab-
lished part. 
This Book Review examines the way Purdy, not always suc-
cessfully, negotiates the challenges of understanding the conse-
quences of erasure and building solidarity across racial divides. 
From this critique, it draws some lessons: First, it is critical, be-
yond acknowledging these histories, to work to understand their 
effects—which are not always self-evident, especially in the study 
of the law. Second, as a consequence of the first point, naming 
erasure is not sufficient to remediate it. And third, mentioning 
diverse perspectives must be the prelude to actually attempting 
to learn from them, and recognizing that a collective understand-
ing of the past and vision for the future requires listening and dia-
logue. Further, this Review introduces other scholarship in order 
to show that the concrete work of understanding how long-sup-
pressed histories have shaped fundamental bodies of American 
law requires reconstructing both erasures and historical narra-
tives; diagnosing the theoretical consequences of erasure; and 
 
Capitalism & Slavery (UNC 1994); W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America 
(Touchstone 1995); Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical 
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 28 See Jake Silverstein, Why We Published The 1619 Project (NY Times, Dec 20, 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NZM6-2PM2. For a discussion of critical scholarly re-
actions to the Project, see Adam Serwer, The Fight over the 1619 Project Is Not About the 
Facts (The Atlantic, Dec 23, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/4V3T-AZJR. 
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retheorizing the law and legal development using new narratives 
and perspectives. 
This project, which has long remained relatively obscure and 
marginal in the legal academy, takes up a critical and urgent 
task—describing our common history, how we came not to know 
it, and its significance for the study and practice of law. Legal 
scholars will increasingly find themselves pressed to confront 
these questions in this climate; people in the legal field, and es-
pecially law students, will notice and inquire about the absence 
of information about these histories from legal texts and law 
school curricula. Many people in and outside the legal academy 
already understand that law played a key role in facilitating the 
conquest of Indigenous lands and the trade of human beings, and 
that these histories therefore raise special questions for the disci-
pline and legal institutions. Legal scholars are in many ways best 
positioned to illuminate the technical role that the law and legal 
institutions played in those processes and the impact that this 
role had on the different practices, doctrines, and institutions that 
constitute our legal system today. However, doing so will require 
openness to questioning what we think we already know, as well 
as to rethinking how we conceive of both our methodology and our 
field. 
Part I outlines the challenges of studying how the erasure of 
histories of racial violence have shaped our understanding of 
American law and legal institutions. Part I.A describes Purdy’s 
project and his efforts to unite a broad readership, which include 
foregrounding the histories of conquest and slavery and their rel-
evance for the present. By doing so, he signals his concern for con-
temporary issues of racial inequity and violence, yet the idea that 
erasures have impeded our ability to understand these histories 
as our common legacy runs contrary to prevailing presumptions 
in much of legal scholarship.29 His adoption of what I will call a 
“presumption of erasure” raises questions about how such a pre-
sumption might disrupt established narratives about law that are 
based on a contrary presumption—that there has been no such 
erasure. Part I.B suggests that the inquiry into how the histories 
of conquest and slavery shaped the main doctrinal fields of law—
for example, the subjects studied by first-years—remains 
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undeveloped. In part, it is difficult to pursue such questions be-
cause the bar for attempting to show the relevance of historical 
foundations that are notably absent from the touchstone narra-
tives in the American legal academy is high.30 Speaking into the 
space of an erasure that no one perceives frequently requires first 
establishing or proving erasure as a precondition to making a pos-
itive claim.31 This Part describes a growing mass of legal scholar-
ship that finds erasure across a number of doctrinal areas, indi-
cating that broad patterns and mechanisms of erasure—including 
citational practices and segregation of source materials—pervade 
legal literatures generally,32 and suggesting that there is eviden-
tiary basis for adopting a presumption of erasure. 
Part II turns to the subtler, constitutive effects of erasure to 
show how its consequences on understanding the law are more 
than a matter of historical accuracy. Part II.A explores the con-
ceptual consequences of erasure. Many widely accepted theoreti-
cal frameworks developed from established historical narratives 
about America evaded the histories of conquest and slavery; the 
 
 30 See generally, for example, James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Free-
dom in the Nineteenth-Century United States (Wis 1956); Morton J. Horwitz, The Trans-
formation of American Law, 1780–1860 (Harvard 1977); Lawrence Friedman, A History of 
American Law (Simon & Schuster 1973). Professor James Willard Hurst’s text provides 
an excellent example of how a scholar can completely elide the history of conquest, even 
while, in essence, writing about it. He begins his work with a detailed discussion of a set-
tlers’ compact in Pike Creek, who had moved onto unceded lands claimed by the Oceti 
Sakowin, Miami, Kickapoo, Potawatomi, and Peoria in anticipation of their future con-
quest. Yet Hurst frames the agreement they form not in terms of how such settlers consti-
tuted an informal labor force that the nation incentivized with land grants to occupy lands 
held by Native Nations, but as an example of citizen-made law, freedom, and democracy. 
See Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom at 3–6. See also Stuart Banner, How the 
Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier 124–29 (Harvard 2005); K-Sue 
Park, Insuring Conquest: U.S. Expansion and the Indian Depredation Claims System, 
1796–1920, 8 Hist of the Present 57, 64–68 (Apr 2018). 
 31 Historical interpretation has never been a uniform or uncontentious endeavor. 
However, the breach between versions of American legal history that engage with the his-
tories of conquest and slavery and those that do not presents a distinct challenge. This 
disparity creates a different order of dispute in that such differences rest not on divergent 
interpretations of facts or marginally varied information, but on substantially different 
fact sets. Further, the strength of such arguments determines the influence they will have 
less than do the powers of habit, inertia, and path dependence. 
 32 Such work usually limits its claims to the boundaries of discrete fields, no doubt 
in part because the work of tracking such erasures more broadly would be unmanageable. 
While these patterns and mechanisms are general, the work of identifying such omissions 
in casebooks, treatises, judicial opinions, and legal scholarship, as well as analyzing the 
consequences of erasure and the significance of omitted material is highly specific to the 
doctrine, subject, and field of practice. See, for example, text accompanying notes 84–96. 
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abstract principles extracted from those frameworks therefore 
bear the marks of that erasure, insofar as different historical ac-
counts would likely have produced different theoretical conclu-
sions about the operation of law. Interrogating the conceptual 
consequences of erasures therefore means reassessing longstand-
ing and widely embraced interpretations, if they were developed 
from partial historical accounts. Different historical narratives 
shape our perspectives and ideas, which, once shaped, are more 
recalcitrant to change than accounts of history from which they 
derive. 
As Part II.B explores, it is therefore possible to formally 
acknowledge these formerly erased histories without appreciat-
ing the extent to which they have shaped one’s own intellectual 
outlook and mode of address. The perspectives and ideas that 
Purdy acknowledges encompass one kind of erasure—the histori-
cal erasure of conquest and slavery—but omit another: the eras-
ure of minority perspectives on these events and the law more 
broadly. Consequently, though his call for a collective ethos ap-
pears to be earnest, Purdy’s ideals, attachments, and the lineages 
he offers themselves reflect a failure to engage with the Indige-
nous call to recognize that this land is not our land. Tacking on 
acknowledgments of differential distribution of harm cannot sub-
stitute for the lesson, long elaborated by critical race theorists, 
that representation of and engagement with different perspec-
tives will substantively change the shape of one’s intellectual 
questions, narrative accounts, and theoretical conclusions. Insen-
sitivity to what experiences and horizons are shared and which 
are not is not a problem specific to Purdy’s book; rather, it is one 
with which he and the broad left/liberal movements committed to 
universal ideals must contend if they ever wish to truly build 
with, and avoid alienating, marginalized groups. The ability to 
discern what is universal and what is particular cannot grow from 
a dearth of perspectives. Failing to include long-ignored perspec-
tives in popular politics and primary legal narratives risks gen-
erating more “universal” perspectives that continue to suppress 
the same voices even as they purport to stand in for “all.” 
I.  ADOPTING A PRESUMPTION OF ERASURE 
This Part considers the importance of history to creating a 
common narrative, both as Professor Purdy presents it and as the 
work of scholars who have investigated the problem of erasure in 
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the study of law reveals. Part I.A describes Purdy’s project in This 
Land is Our Land, the way it aims at inclusivity by acknowledg-
ing the histories of conquest and slavery and their erasure, and 
some of the contradictions between this acknowledgment and the 
universal prescriptions of the book. Part I.B endorses and under-
scores the particular salience for the legal academy of Purdy’s 
proposition that histories of racial violence inform the present. It 
describes a growing body of scholarship that has tracked the eras-
ure of these histories across many legal fields, suggesting that 
that there is good reason to adopt a presumption of erasure in the 
study of the law and that the mechanisms of this erasure have 
constituted a fairly consistent set of citational, framing, and or-
ganizational practices. 
A. Purdy’s Vision of a Commonwealth 
The political ideal that Purdy recommends we embrace in 
This Land is Our Land is that of a “commonwealth”—a term he 
traces back to Middle English that denotes “‘the general good’ or 
the well-being of the whole community.”33 The freedom, dignity, 
and health that he imagines this form of political organization 
will bring depend, in his conception, on a reorganization of the 
economy and a new approach to infrastructure.34 This emphasis 
on the material underpinnings of freedom and politics accords 
with the emphasis on political economy that Purdy has champi-
oned within the legal academy. He writes: 
No story or picture of the world matters much if it floats too 
far from what people do with one another’s bodies and with 
soil and weapons and other tools; but also and by the same 
token, no material change in power will go forward without 
ideas and images that give it shape and a horizon to aim for.35 
As more of a philosopher than a materialist—Purdy is much more 
theorist than wonk—he devotes most of the content of his book to 
describing the latter project of sketching the horizon through nar-
rative example and self-reflection, emphasizing the material 
stakes and motivations of our institutions. By doing so, he hopes 
 
 33 See Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xi–xii (cited in note 1). 
 34 See, for example, id at xiv (citing Bayard Rustin’s calls “for public works and train-
ing, for national economic planning, for federal aid to education, [and] for attractive public 
housing”). 
 35 Id at 3. 
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to convince us that “a commonwealth is not a gauzy utopian ideal: 
it is radical and practical.”36 
The tour Purdy takes us on—“how American earth has al-
ways held the people on it apart together, and how the borders at 
the country’s edges and the borderlines that fracture ‘the home-
land’ are linked in a single web”37—moves through fights over 
public and private lands, including Ammon Bundy’s occupation of 
the Malheur Wildlife Refuge in Oregon; the Bears Ears and 
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments in Utah; Appa-
lachian coal country, where Purdy grew up; Flint, Michigan; and 
Durham, North Carolina, where Purdy lived for many years while 
he was a law professor at Duke. To guide us through this land-
scape and communicate his political vision, Purdy draws on his 
own personal experiences and love of nature to bring this work 
into the “self-as-story” genre that has been effectively vitalized by 
writers such as J.D. Vance and Ta-Nehisi Coates in recent 
times.38 His embrace of a method of introspective philosophical 
reflection also places him squarely within a transcendentalist tra-
dition that encompasses a number of his heroes—such as Henry 
David Thoreau, Wendell Berry, and Rachel Carson—in addition 
to such contemporary writers as Rebecca Solnit and Marilyn Rob-
inson. In lines that could pass as a paraphrase of John Locke’s 
first and most famous statements about property, Purdy wields 
this geography, form, and tradition to argue that “[t]he world be-
longs in principle to all who are born into it. . . . A common-
wealth’s engagement with the problem of global sharing must 
start from the premise that everyone alive has an equal claim to 
thrive in this world.”39 
In the first essay of this collection, which goes by the book’s 
title, Purdy describes the problem of “civic enmity” and presents 
his central idea that the land “belongs originally and essentially 
to everyone, that it is a commonwealth.”40 The second, “Reckon-
ings,” describes the toxic effect of industries on the people whose 
livelihoods and survival depend on them in Appalachia and else-
where. Purdy’s third chapter, “Losing a Country,” provides an 
 
 36 Id at xx. 
 37 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at viii (cited in note 1). 
 38 See generally J.D. Vance, Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis 
(HarperCollins 2016); Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between the World and Me (Spiegel & Grau 2015). 
 39 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 98–99 (cited in note 1). 
 40 Id at 1, 28. 
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extended meditation on his own shock in the wake of the 2016 
election in conversation with Thoreau and the natural landscape. 
His fourth focuses on infrastructure, the heedless and dangerous 
logic behind its current growth, and the possibility of rebuilding 
it to support a different way of living. The last essay offers a ge-
nealogy of “The Long Environmental Justice Movement” as a 
source of inspiration. And, finally, his conclusive “Forward” ad-
dresses the need to prioritize “the value of life” rather than con-
ceptualize value primarily through “the more precise and neutral 
concept of price.”41 
Across this collection of essays, Purdy’s reflections shift 
smoothly between descriptions of material conditions in the land-
scape he charts and such subjects as the way historical violence 
has shaped American identities, the link between environmental 
and economic vulnerability, the power of the built environment to 
determine how we live and to shape our choices and outlooks, the 
commitments that drive different political factions, and the prob-
lem of denialism. In particular, for Purdy, climate denialism is 
not merely a denial of the validity of scientific claims, but an 
“ethos that refuses to see how the world is deeply plural at every 
scale and that we are in it together.”42 
Over this survey of our national landscape and its afflictions, 
Purdy elaborates the ethic that he believes must guide a new and 
egalitarian approach to constructing an economy and infrastruc-
ture in sweepingly broad terms: We must believe, he argues, in “a 
way of living in deep reciprocity as well as deep equality,” not only 
with one another, but with the planet.43 “We should root our-
selves,” he further urges, “in helping the world, human and natu-
ral, to go on being.”44 Developing this relationship with the natu-
ral world and one another, Purdy recognizes, depends on 
cooperation: “No one can choose these values alone because they 
depend on the shared commitments of others and on the shape 
and terms of a built and shared world.”45 A world guided by this 
communitarian ideal, he cautions, will require us to take respon-
sibility for our own actions and to confront our accountability to 
others: “The freedom of that community would not be freedom 
 
 41 Id at 142. 
 42 Id at 14–15 (emphasis in original). 
 43 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xiii (cited in note 1). 
 44 Id at 148. 
 45 Id at 150. 
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from the consequences of your actions. It would not be freedom 
from dependence on others, or from responsibility for them.”46 
Perhaps above all, a new economy that could support this set of 
relationships would require us to sacrifice ways of living that we 
have come to take for granted as we “ask what wealth itself is and 
what is the value of life.”47 In the future, Purdy hopes, “value will 
lie in work that does what is necessary and sustains its own con-
ditions of possibility, in rest that contemplates a broken but still 
wondrous world.”48 
The path that bridges the troubled present to this possible 
future in Purdy’s account is recognizing our inescapable connect-
edness, and the key to doing so, for him, lies in learning the his-
tory of the land itself. To the end of illuminating that history, 
Purdy not only shares stories of communities’ struggles in rela-
tion to the land in parts of West Virginia, Kentucky, Durham, and 
elsewhere, but also commits clearly to the premise that conquest 
and enslavement laid the foundation for colonial growth and the 
very possibility of the nation. He writes that “[c]olonists ‘justified’ 
taking the land of Indigenous people by insisting that only set-
tlers and farmers could properly own and rule a terrain”;49 and 
“[a]fter the land itself, the other great extraction of wealth was 
from the labor of enslaved people.”50 Further, the “cycles of boom 
and bust” fueled by land speculation in “frontier land,” Purdy tells 
us, “never really ended.”51 And “[a]fter the frontier came redlin-
ing,”52 so that “[t]he chasm between white and black wealth is 
rooted in control of property, and it abides there.”53 
Furthermore, as he insists on these long-buried truths as 
foundational, Purdy also squarely acknowledges that he is speak-
ing into a void of erasure that has shaped dominant popular con-
sciousness. Though “[t]he land remembers” the history that 
shaped its terrain, he writes, we have largely lost the ability to do 
the same: “[W]hat do we remember of it?”54 He explains that these 
erasures matter because they inform the claims people make on 
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the land today: “Every political contest over claims on the land is, 
in part, a contest over what will be remembered and what will be 
forgotten. With forgetting, the way things are sinks into the land 
itself, as if it became nature.”55 “Forgetting,” for Purdy, has bred 
national mythologies in the negative space of the histories of col-
onization and slavery, while continuing to facilitate violent pro-
cesses targeting non-white people. Purdy spies the “ecological 
echo” of Jim Crow in the “green canopy over the white boulevards” 
that mark “the old color line” where historically segregated sub-
urbs began.56 And ongoing gentrification, he asserts, is the direct 
descendant of redlining: “‘color-blind’ markets have replaced 
poorer black and Latino residents with whiter and wealthier peo-
ple almost as systematically as segregation once did—albeit with 
more nuance and deniability.”57 
In short, Purdy locates the roots of what he later calls “our 
civic enmity”—the bitter dissension that rends the American pub-
lic—in the nation’s tremendously violent, suppressed inheritance. 
In his introduction, Purdy pointedly outlines the sweeping impact 
of this past upon the present: “[T]he history of this continent’s 
past five centuries,” he writes, “is woven from fantasy on the one 
hand and the relentless and often inhumane and destructive ex-
traction of wealth on the other.”58 Further, the great “differential 
violence that molds white, black, and brown bodies to the concrete 
abstractions of race and caste”59 remains “written on the land: in 
how people are distributed across it, who owns it and who can 
imagine, after a few generations, that their people have a claim 
that is nearly primordial and even in harmony with the expecta-
tions of the place itself.”60 These far-reaching observations have 
huge implications for precisely the kinds of projects in which 
Purdy is professionally invested—namely, legal scholarship and 
political ideation. The questions they raise about the fantasies of 
liberal democracy—historical narratives about the country prem-
ised, as Purdy notes, on the omission of the destructive extraction 
that underpinned the country’s development, and the violence 
visited on racial minorities whose bodies and lands were sites of 
 
 55 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xvii (cited in note 1). 
 56 Id at xvii. 
 57 Id at xvi. 
 58 Id at xv. 
 59 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xvi (cited in note 1). 
 60 Id at xvi. 
2020] This Land Is Not Our Land 1991 
 
extraction—are equally applicable to both types of endeavors. To 
what extent have those narratives informed our understanding of 
legal and political institutions, of the political ideals we hold dear, 
the horizons of our political imaginations, and our very sense of 
self? 
In the face of these crucial questions, and the scars of the vi-
olence that perpetuate deep inequalities, Purdy’s later prescrip-
tion that what we need is to recognize that “[a]ny arrangement 
for living together has both sides, and they have to be understood 
together,”61 frankly feels evasive. Elsewhere, too, he calls for 
unity on a theory that seems based more on co-residence than on 
the project of unpacking the profoundly troubled history that pro-
duced the schisms of today. The doors he opens to an inquiry 
about the past collapse into the present, for example, when he 
writes that “[t]he land exemplifies the country all too truly: it is 
the site of fights over whose country is being taken away, who is 
the patriot and who is the usurper or trespasser.”62 To whom is 
this claim addressed? Can Purdy be speaking to the descendants 
of the people who lost their land to settlers? Is it the descendants 
of those settlers? Is he attempting to speak to both at once, or to 
mediate their concerns by suggesting they are equivalent? Do the 
specific histories that underpin such conflicts suggest that a sin-
gle answer is appropriate for “both sides”?63 Is the observation 
that “there is no agreement on the answer” to the question “how 
[ ] people who live together come to see one another as enemies”64 
all we can draw from the past? The histories that Purdy laid down 
as fundamental to the nation seemed to confirm that usurpation 
and trespass occurred, and that there is a long and complicated 
story to be told about how people in America came “to see one 
another as enemies.” The ideas that “[t]here has never been 
enough public space for the contending publics who want it,”65 or 
that “the things that tie people together and the things that divide 
them tend to be the same things,”66 irresolutely back away from 
the lessons that particular histories have to teach us about the 
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specific common ground and sources of injury between people, es-
pecially if we could learn them together. 
This tension, however, is a productive site for returning to 
Purdy’s own insight that the key to resolving our conflicts lies in 
recognizing—and probing—the long-buried history of the great 
racial violences that produced this nation and the contours of the 
land. Purdy’s difficulty in developing this analysis speaks less to 
any personal failing than to the points where this public conver-
sation very commonly stalls: What is the purpose of acknowledg-
ing these histories, and what do we gain from studying them? 
How do we differently understand the United States, our place in 
it, the problems that fester across it, the institutions that govern 
it, and future possibilities for any of these things if we undertake 
a collective examination of this common but suppressed past? 
These questions have been so infrequently asked by the American 
public at large that we have a generally underdeveloped sense of 
how to ask them and few specific answers to them yet. So it is 
hugely valuable, as Purdy does, to raise these questions in such a 
way that frames the inquiry as our collective task. The next Sec-
tion, Part I.B, examines the specific challenges and contours of 
taking erasure as an object of inquiry within Purdy’s field—law—
before turning in Part II to subtler challenges of erasure that im-
pact our understandings of law and legal institutions, but also 
political conversations and the possibility of mutual understand-
ing that Purdy foregrounds as critical to building solidarity and 
movements on the Left. 
B. Taking Erasure as an Object of Inquiry 
A growing body of legal scholarship suggests that erasure of 
the histories of conquest, slavery, and race is widespread across 
doctrinal areas. This scholarship demonstrates that, methodolog-
ically, the work of (re)constructing how the histories of conquest 
and slavery affected the development of law and legal institutions 
requires both gleaning stories from the record and investigating 
how they became invisible in legal scholarship, legal education, 
and legal practice. These findings concerning erasure give us a 
more precise understanding of the mechanisms through which 
that erasure occurred, including path-dependent citational prac-
tices that reproduce choices about framing, selection, and editing 
in casebooks, treatises, court documents, and scholarship. Addi-
tionally, the sources containing information about minority 
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groups, and thus about conquest, slavery, or race, are sometimes 
different than those that contain the traditional records of refer-
ence for a field of study, producing the tendency to read segre-
gated records as absence. Though ongoing and incomplete, this 
scholarship accords with a well-developed and abundant histori-
cal scholarship that suggests there is good reason to presume 
widespread erasure in historical accounts of American develop-
ment, including American legal development.67 
In general, the scholarship addressing erasure is difficult to 
characterize because it is ongoing and uneven with respect to con-
quest, slavery, and race more generally, as well as across legal 
fields. Scholars of constitutional law may have most clearly artic-
ulated the problem of erasure after Professor Sanford Levinson 
identified the absence of slavery in the field in the early 1990s,68 
triggering a shift in the canon. Following in this vein, Professor 
Gregory Ablavsky showed recently in a series of articles that 
omitting Natives has led to incomplete and inaccurate readings 
of the Constitutional Convention,69 the importance of the land 
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question to the Founders,70 and the rise of dual federalism.71 Last 
year, noting the broad success of Levinson’s intervention, Profes-
sor Maggie Blackhawk also argued for another paradigm shift in 
the field with respect to colonization.72 Blackhawk showed that 
“[m]any areas of constitutional law were built and refined by in-
teractions with Native Nations, Native peoples, and Native 
lands.”73 Observing that “a state of near erasure of Native Nations 
and indigenous peoples” prevails in canonical constitutional 
texts, she added that examining the history of US interaction 
with Native Nations, beyond simple inclusion in the canon, “could 
contribute to a fundamental rethinking of public law princi-
ples”—including different views of the treaty power, separation of 
powers, the war powers, and powers inherent in sovereignty, 
among others.74 
The work of uncovering counternarratives is relatively ad-
vanced in property law as well, where today, virtually every prop-
erty law casebook in circulation acknowledges the foundational 
status of Johnson v M’Intosh, 75 an 1823 Chief Justice John Mar-
shall decision that identified conquest at the root of every chain 
of title in the United States.76 A few casebooks also address the 
topic of slavery, and Professors Alfred L. Brophy, Alberto Lopez, 
and Kali N. Murray have written a wonderful supplement elabo-
rating on conquest, slavery, and other parts of the history of race 
and property.77 Nonetheless, there are many ways that these his-
tories have become imprinted upon the field of law that few real-
ize. For one anecdotal example, I recently stumbled across Wil-
liam M. Burwell’s White Acre vs. Black Acre: A Case at Law,78 and 
only thereby learned that “Blackacre” and “Whiteacre”—the legal 
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kadigans for fictional estates that appeared, though infrequently, 
in English legal treatises and now pepper property-law hypothet-
icals and bar questions79—constituted the title of a proslavery 
novel published the same year as Dred Scott v Sandford80 in re-
sponse to Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin.81 In this 
exceptionally dehumanizing work, the White Acre farm repre-
sents an incompetent northern farm and Black Acre represents a 
southern plantation tended by loyal, hardworking slaves.82 Likely 
neither professors nor bar examiners who use these terms are 
aware of this particular part of their history, nor can they make 
informed choices about their continued use of them. 
Recently, I examined approximately two hundred property 
law casebooks for any mention of conquest, slavery, or race,83 be-
ginning with the first, published in 1888 by Professor John Chip-
man Gray.84 It is worth noting that casebooks offer a useful index 
of erasure, as they play a critical role in first-year legal education 
and in maintaining a fairly stubborn canon.85 Levinson’s com-
ment about casebooks was widely applicable—substituting virtu-
ally any subject for “constitutional”—in that it remains 
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only slightly hyperbolic to say that any students whose 
knowledge of American constitutional history will be derived 
from their immersion in [such casebooks] will have only the 
dimmest realization that the United States ever included a 
system of chattel slavery or, just as importantly, that its im-
plications pervaded every single aspect of constitutional law 
(and constitutional interpretation).86 
I found that despite “the magnitude of the interest in litiga-
tion”87 at the time Johnson was decided, its frequent appearance 
in nineteenth-century treatises,88 and its ubiquity now, not a single 
property law casebook between 1888 and 1959 included a reprint 
of the case.89 Nor did any casebook describe legal approaches to 
extinguishing Indian title, a centuries-long preoccupation of gov-
ernments, nor how property law practices in the colonies or the 
United States helped established Anglo-American claims to lands 
held by Native Nations. Rather, casebooks avoid law from colonial 
America altogether, despite key developments from that period in 
land laws and practices that heavily informed the United States’ 
land system, such as the headright system, land grants and sub-
sidies through which governments procured the labor of settle-
ment, the survey system, preemption laws, and foreclosure. With 
respect to the United States, the casebooks contain no mention of 
the surveyor general, the Land Office, the Preemption Act or the 
Homestead Act, which constitute such an important part of the 
country’s lore. Instead, they incorporated nearly as many English 
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as US federal and state cases, and focused their discussions of 
historical foundations on feudal English land practices.90 As a re-
sult of these framing choices,91 students whose understanding of 
property law was based on any casebook in the field published 
before 1974 would have had no notion that title to every parcel of 
land within the territorial boundaries of the United States de-
rives originally from Indian title or cession, or that laws played a 
critical role in the dual processes of conquest and establishment 
of the US land system. 
The inclusion of the topic of slavery today remains highly un-
even, and the record shows that this partial, persistent erasure is 
the result of a history that has taken more than one turn. For the 
first two decades after 1888, all property law casebooks that I ex-
amined included cases directly involving or citing cases involving 
property in enslaved people to teach doctrines such as conversion, 
statutes of limitation, replevin, trespass, bailment, ejection, and 
more.92 Most casebooks included several slavery cases until the 
1930s, when the number of casebooks that dropped all cases in-
volving property in enslaved people from their texts increased.93 
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The last casebook to include slavery cases appeared in 1942,94 af-
ter which I could find no casebooks that included any. Some in-
cluded an edited version of a case that had cited slavery cases, but 
with that portion edited out.95 The history of slavery thereby be-
came invisible in casebooks, so that for the following several dec-
ades, students would have had no inkling from the property law 
casebooks that “the United States ever included a system of chat-
tel slavery”96 and that enslaved people for centuries constituted a 
highly significant form of property in America. Before then, some 
students might have had a sense of how common it had been to 
claim property in human beings, but they would not have had 
tools to understand the legal structure of the institution, its arc 
or end, the racial social order it entrenched, or its relationship to 
the growth and development of the land market in the colonies 
and the United States. 
However, as I teach my own students, relatively newly ac-
quired land and enslaved people together constituted the vast ma-
jority of all property held by colonists on the eve of the Revolu-
tion;97 enslaved labor fueled territorial expansion, while 
territorial expansion drove the growth of the slave trade; and en-
slaved labor presents the most profound institutional contradic-
tion to the theory that labor creates property entitlements98—a 
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ubiquitous part of property law syllabi—in American history. The 
civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the climate created by the 
Black Power movement, the American Indian Movement (AIM), 
and others, seem to have ushered in a significant shift with re-
spect to casebook authors’ willingness to confront the ways that 
race historically shaped property and property law in America.99 
In 1974, Professor Charles Donahue and his co-authors incorpo-
rated the text of Johnson into a casebook for the first time,100 and 
property law casebooks increasingly began to incorporate John-
son thereafter.101 In 1978, Professor Richard Chused published an 
extraordinary casebook that included lengthy sections on John-
son, conquest, federal Indian law, slavery, racial and gender dis-
crimination in housing, as well as women’s property rights.102 And 
in the 1990s, Professor Joseph Singer’s integration of elements of 
the histories of conquest and slavery with the doctrines of the tra-
ditional property law curriculum greatly helped to normalize ac-
knowledgment of the centrality of these histories to the field.103 
Though these casebook authors did not explicitly address the 
problem of erasure, they offered material to counter it, and 
thereby reset the margins of the field. 
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Nonetheless, some of the most widely adopted casebooks con-
tinue to eschew any mention of slavery.104 Further, while canonicity 
matters greatly (since “very few professors include in their syllabi 
material that is not presented in one or another of the standard 
casebooks”105), the mere availability of materials does not ensure 
that people will teach those topics. Teachers are likely to default 
to subjects more familiar and comfortable to them, and conquest 
and slavery are unlikely to be familiar or comfortable subjects for 
any who have not made them a special area of research. Though 
Johnson is now ubiquitous, casebook authors’ notes for the case 
vary widely,106 addressing principles such as first-in-time,107 cer-
tainty,108 and only occasionally, the crucial issue that the case ac-
tually settled—chain of title.109 Often, the explanations of the dis-
covery doctrine are limited and sometimes inaccurate,110 and 
Chief Justice Marshall’s admittedly winding discussion of how 
European and colonial entities applied the discovery doctrine to 
their conquests almost never appears.111 The result is more con-
fusion than clarity about the history of conquest. Just as Johnson 
 
 104 The current, 2018 edition of the leading casebook by Dukeminier, et al, mentions 
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is a difficult case to teach in the absence of expertise or adequate 
teaching aids, property law professors that do address slavery 
usually excerpt Dred Scott, whose convoluted discussion focuses 
on constitutional law questions of federalism and citizenship that 
are challenging and involve more complex legal questions than 
those typically presented during the first year. The difficulty of 
clearly connecting the case to property law—beyond the point 
that to treat human beings as property crosses moral boundaries 
that should also be legal boundaries—further deters many from 
teaching this history at all. Moreover, though important, both 
Johnson and Dred Scott are monumental Supreme Court cases 
unrepresentative of property cases in general, or, more specifi-
cally, the extensive body of colonial, state, and US cases involving 
property law questions and Indian title or property in slaves. 
Many property law professors, in keeping with firmly established 
tradition and likely their own legal education, are likely not to 
prioritize teaching these histories, even if some material about 
them is available, and even if they are open to unconventional 
approaches to the subject. 
A key conundrum of attempting to teach into the space left 
by an erasure is that the information that demonstrates the con-
nection between histories of conquest and slavery and any given 
area of law is largely not available, even to scholars in the field, 
without taking erasure itself as an object of study. We are newly 
aware, for example, of the breathtaking extent to which “judges 
and litigants [ ] continue to treat slave cases as good law” because 
of Professor Justin Simard’s painstaking research, now cata-
logued in a public database, containing over three hundred dis-
putes in which contemporary judges cited slavery cases.112 Simard 
found that approximately 80 percent of cases that cited slavery in 
the last thirty-five years—including in decisions from courts in a 
majority of states, most federal courts of appeals, and the Su-
preme Court—did not acknowledge the content of slavery in the 
case.113 If he had not tracked, compiled, and studied the original 
texts of these cases, it would be impossible to realize when a sin-
gle case from a string cite or block quotation represents the living 
legacy of slavery, to understand the cumulative extent of this 
 
 112 See Justin Simard, Citing Slavery, 72 Stan L Rev 79, 94, 97 (2020). For the data-
base, see Justin Simard, Citing Slavery (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/5NYY-B5GB.  
 113 Simard, 72 Stan L Rev at 81–82, 97–98 (cited in note 112). 
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legacy, or to ask questions about its effects. Moreover, the collec-
tion of this erasure permits Simard to observe that the law of slav-
ery penetrated and pervaded the fields not only of property, but 
also “contracts, [ ] civil procedure, criminal procedure, statutory 
interpretation, torts, and many other fields.”114 Scholars have tra-
ditionally conceived of the “law of slavery” as consisting of laws 
governing the status and disability of enslaved persons, their 
punishment, and their capture115—a now obsolete body of law. 
However, the fundamental legal subjects from which that body 
was distinguished in fact regulated commerce in slaves, in ways 
that may well have influenced their development. As Simard 
writes, slavery cases were “part of the foundation of American ju-
risprudence,”116 and judges facilitated this all-important market 
through common law cases concerning disputes about “negligent 
damage to property, adverse possession, double jeopardy, the con-
duct of executors, contract interpretation, jury discretion in for-
feiture cases, dram-shop liability, marriage, estoppel, capacity, 
examination of witnesses, fraudulent conveyance, statutory inter-
pretation, and many other doctrines.”117 
Despite the fact that, as Simard’s research affirms, virtually 
every area of law constituted a part of the law of slavery118 (not to 
mention conquest119), erasures of these histories have received 
even less attention than most of the other basic subjects of the 
law school curriculum. The citational mechanics of how omissions 
perpetuate omissions accord, and sometimes converge, with the 
ways that legal citational practice hides historical context. The 
study of such erasures suggests that the various processes that 
produce it include, inter alia, choices of frameworks, selection, 
and editing. From one edition of a casebook or treatise to the next, 
we see selection and editing choices in omissions of cases involv-
ing Native people, slaves, free Black people, or other nonwhites, 
 
 114 Id at 81. 
 115 See id at 86. See also generally Thomas D. Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 
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 116 Simard, 72 Stan L Rev at 85 (cited in note 112). 
 117 Id at 94–95. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See Blackhawk, 132 Harv L Rev at 1800 (noting that “interactions between the 
national government and Native Nations shaped the warp and woof of United States con-
stitutional law from the Founding”) (cited in note 72); Angela R. Riley, Native Nations and 
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or portions of cases mentioning them, or even, in some instances, 
specific words identifying nonwhites in the text of cases. With re-
spect to race, for example, Professor Kevin Johnson noted that be-
tween the seventh and eighth editions of their civil procedure case-
book, one set of authors edited language out of a 1961 “garden-
variety automobile accident case” from the Mississippi Supreme 
Court “not[ing] that a witness (Hal Buckley) was ‘a Negro man.’”120 
Professor Dylan Penningroth has conducted extensive primary re-
search for an article-in-progress to identify similar examples of 
erasures in influential casebooks, treatises, and articles.121 
In addition to citational practices, erasure in legal texts also 
results from the particularity of sources that contain records per-
taining to conquest, slavery, and race. The long history of segre-
gation is reflected in the fact that the sources of records concern-
ing nonwhites frequently cannot be found in precisely the same 
places that records concerning whites are kept, even with respect 
to parties’ involvement in the same kind of transaction, doctrine, 
or practice.122 Cases involving litigants of color, for example, 
might not reach appellate courts, leading scholars examining rec-
ords from higher courts to miss their role in shaping legal prac-
tices and norms.123 My research on the history of mortgage fore-
closure in colonial America describes transactions for land 
between Native people and colonists that are memorialized in 
public deed records and private account books,124 but did not ap-
pear in the colonial legislation that other scholars have 
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examined.125 The difficulty of anticipating the variety of relevant 
sources to the history, in other words, has made it easy to overlook 
the earliest history of foreclosure in America.126 
The work that has engaged the legal academy in the task of 
investigating erasure suggests that it is reasonable to adopt a pre-
sumption of erasure, or at least, raises the question of what evi-
dence would justify one. Acknowledging these histories and their 
erasure, as Purdy does, is a necessary first step; however, track-
ing erasures by considering these various possibilities and 
(re)constructing the history of a legal doctrine or practice requires 
significant labor. Scholars looking only at legislation but not 
county deed records, at records from higher courts but not lower 
ones, or even lower court decisions but not county records, might 
perceive absence of nonwhites in a field where they were highly 
active. The difficulty of knowing whether information is missing 
from a given record, what the significance of that information is, 
and whether other pertinent archives exist is formidable. Never-
theless, work inside and outside the legal academy further sug-
gests that the regulation of the trade in enslaved persons was a 
massive part of regulating market activity for courts;127 that con-
quest and creating a system of property law in America were part 
of the same endeavor; that everyday business could not proceed 
without transacting with racial minorities, leading to claims that 
would have come before courts. It appears from this work that 
frequently, by failing to consider these histories, we have formed 
conclusions and presumptions about law on the basis of incom-
plete information, both with respect to individual cases and struc-
tural questions concerning the development of key doctrines and 
practices. The pervasiveness of patterns of erasure across fields—
together with the challenges of identifying and understanding 
erasures—further advise that the work on erasure and these his-
tories’ role in shaping American law likely represents merely a 
floor of significance. 
 
 125 See generally, for example, Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Al-
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II.  CONSEQUENCES OF ERASURE 
Recognizing erasure is a necessary first step for understand-
ing how histories of conquest, slavery, and race shaped American 
legal institutions. However, erasure presents problems that are 
not solely a matter of correcting the historical record, or of factual 
inaccuracy. The legacies of erasure are also conceptual and social, 
affecting perspective, representation, inequality, and the very 
possibility of communicating effectively across differences. While 
the relationship between perspective and representation may al-
ready appear intuitive—for example, it is a familiar idea that in-
cluding (and representing) different groups in institutions brings 
diverse perspectives—this Part examines the ways that each con-
cept constitutes a consequence of erasure and requires engaging 
an additional body of literature. 
Part II.A addresses the necessity of looking at historical ac-
counts of legal doctrines or practices that do not discuss conquest, 
slavery, or race, in order to determine how much the history in-
fluenced the theory. Many broadly accepted ideas, norms, and ide-
als about the US legal system derive from filtered narratives. As 
Professor Purdy sensitively shows, one’s acceptance of specific 
histories, and not others, shapes one’s perspectives and one’s at-
tachment to such ideas, norms, and ideals. 
Part II.B discusses how literature from federal Indian law, 
legal history, and critical race studies helps furnish some of the 
information that is absent from other literatures. By describing 
how the laws during conquest, slavery, and their aftermath pro-
duced persistent problems of representation of nonwhites—
through formal exclusion, predatory inclusion, and cultivation of 
harmful racial stereotypes—this literature also highlights the 
value of representation: other perspectives on, contributions to, 
and conceptions of the law whose absences have both distorted 
our understandings of how we arrived at our present predica-
ments and challenged our ability to communicate about our col-
lective history. 
A. The Challenge of Perspective 
Throughout his book, on the wide terrain for “everyone” that 
Purdy maps, he routinely marks the problem of different 
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perspectives.128 The thread of the book is his reference to “the 
world we have made,” but of course, he acknowledges, “it isn’t 
simply ‘we’—it’s the effects some of us are having on the planet, 
unequally visited on others, through the medium of the world it-
self, its floods and droughts and killing heat.”129 Mentioning the 
deportation of Samuel Oliver-Bruno from Durham, where Purdy 
himself lived free from this threat, he comments, “[s]ome have 
more to fear than others.”130 Similarly, he describes “what the 
United States has often promised and sometimes delivered to its 
insiders, the ones who have been counted as full members in the 
community”131—“the promise that leaders and prophets have 
made again and again, at least to those insiders who have counted 
as ‘real Americans’” 132—to implicitly underscore the exclusion of 
many outsiders. Equality, dignity, and safety are promises he 
wants for everyone, but because of the nation’s foundational his-
tory, land’s “ownership means power for some over others”;133 
“[t]he land is sorted into those who own the places where they 
live, those who own another’s place[,] . . . and those who work 
there on the sufferance of at-will hiring and firing.”134 For Purdy, 
perspective comes out of the past and will shape the future: His-
tory “confirms that what Americans inherit in common is terribly 
unequal and compromised.”135 And without a new commons, he 
warns, “those of us who enjoy some freedom and small power in 
this world will have to choose between cynically hoarding a 
chance at half decent survival for our own families and closest 
allies or nihilistically watching crises crash at the walls of this 
unequal world.”136 
Indeed, Purdy places a chapter on appreciating the total, em-
bodied, and affective character of perspective at the very center of 
his book.137 In “Losing a Country,” he writes about his response to 
President Donald Trump’s election, confessing that “nothing has 
 
 128 See, for example, Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 1–2 (cited in note 1) (con-
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hit me quite like 2016.”138 He locates the root of his shock in hav-
ing felt the boundaries of his own perspective: “Shaken,” he won-
dered, “What else have I failed to understand about this place?”139 
Reeling, he finds a point of identification and guidance in an 1854 
essay by Thoreau called “Slavery in Massachusetts,” and, in par-
ticular, Thoreau’s “disorientation” and visceral sense that his 
world was falling apart after Massachusetts’s return of Anthony 
Burns to a Virginia slaveholder140 in compliance with the Fugitive 
Slave Act.141 Indeed, his chapter takes its title from Thoreau, who 
wrote, “I have lived for the last month . . . with the sense of having 
suffered a vast and indefinite loss. I did not know at first what 
ailed me. At last it occurred to me that what I had lost was a 
country.”142 Purdy, like Thoreau, details the emotional upheaval 
that comes with feeling one’s perspective shift: “Losing a country,” 
he realizes, means “losing your way of living with it. The country 
has not receded far away, but grown overwhelmingly close. It oc-
cupies your head in the most disruptive and intolerable ways.”143 
Further, he continues, 
A country lost in this fashion may never have been more than 
a pleasing illusion, a gauze of selective ignorance or indiffer-
ence. “Losing a country” may be a way of describing coming 
to see it more clearly. . . . Thoreau is complaining about, 
among other things, losing the privilege of ignoring slavery 
much of the time while also disapproving of it.144 
Somewhat fleetingly, Purdy acknowledges other perspectives and 
the pattern of erasure that left Anthony Burns’s thoughts out of 
the court record (and Thoreau’s musings).145 He imagines Burns 
“knew a great deal about the United States, and it seems likely 
that in his mind he had no country to lose.”146 However, he admits, 
“I am much more Thoreau than Burns,”147 acknowledging that “to 
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be able to make this complaint publicly, to report on your new and 
unsettling experience of citizenship, is also a part of privilege.”148 
By speaking from his own standpoint, Purdy grounds us in 
the question of perspective, as he reports: “This is a deliberately 
personal way of talking about paths out of, or through, the dark 
wood where some of us woke up on November 9, 2016, and have 
been wandering since.”149 The election outcome that disturbed his 
consciousness and sent him reeling took Purdy to the history of 
slavery, and Thoreau’s similarly shattered faith. Through that 
identification, Purdy recognizes that neither Massachusetts’s en-
forcement of the Fugitive Slave Act nor Trump’s election would 
necessarily have caught someone else so off guard. As he under-
stands, someone enslaved, like Burns, would have comprehended 
the risks of fugitivity under the country’s laws; someone who reg-
ularly bore the brunt of white supremacy in the United States 
might have better anticipated the powerful appeal of the racism 
that brought Trump to power.150 Throughout this essay, Purdy 
registers his own sense of shock at the difference between his own 
and another’s perspective—between their experiences, sensibili-
ties, worldviews, attachments, and expectations. The limit of his 
own consciousness that so hurt him appears to be a recognition 
that the difference between him and another was that other’s ex-
perience of unequally distributed violence—a perspective erased 
within his own experience—which might have led the other to 
have expected the outcome of the election. 
Purdy’s lengthy set of reflections here indexes how viscerally 
painful it is to release attachments to concepts and understand-
ings of the world that arose—in ways he did not fully understand 
until the contradictions broke—from the erasure of others’ 
worldviews. The difficulty of reassessing foundational assump-
tions and wrestling with the significance of erasure occurs across 
varieties of experiences, domains of practice, and dissemination 
of scholarship, including legal scholarship. In law, moreover, the 
challenge of rethinking meets a particularly obdurate set of 
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foundational assumptions, and many of these assumptions are 
formulated abstractly rather than as a matter of historical com-
mitment or formation. Concepts of law, like the ideals and norms 
associated with them, are not always understood as products of 
historical formation; the abstract terms used to summarize these 
basic subjects often seem to float independently above our shift-
ing sense of the nation’s historical arc. 
An outcome that did not accord with how Purdy understood 
his world forced him to search for new stories or facts that could 
explain it, leading him to newly conceptualize the world and his 
position in it. Similarly, new insights into the historical develop-
ment of legal fields can affect parts of the conceptual universe 
that legal scholars have long taken for granted, and in general, 
offer evidence germane to questions about the development of dif-
ferent areas of law. I have argued, for example, that the system 
of Indian depredation claims—an independent archive of peti-
tions turned claims against the government to indemnify losses 
incurred by settlers on the frontier—constitutes a part of the his-
tory of federal torts, and shed light on the way the federal govern-
ment utilized the tort structure to provide a system of social in-
surance that supported westward expansion.151 Similarly to the 
way Morton Horwitz theorized courts’ shift from strict liability to 
negligence in torts cases to create a subsidy for employers at a 
time when increasing numbers of people were suffering from 
workplace injuries,152 the history of Indian depredation claims 
suggests that the government created a subsidy for itself by de-
laying compensation that it had guaranteed to individuals to in-
duce them to settle on the frontier and thereby further its goals 
of conquest.153 
Methodologically, attempting to understand the significance 
of erasure in specific fields of law requires comprehensively en-
gaging scholarship about a legal doctrine or practice generated 
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from a standpoint without access to buried material or a pre-
sumption of erasure. That literature may contain clues about the 
configuration of the erasure so that this study is correlated with 
building a positive account using new material from the archive. 
However, many widely established theories about legal doctrines 
that appear in works that do not themselves engage with history 
were nevertheless developed from interpretations of historical ac-
counts. It is therefore also critical to examine the general litera-
ture in order to understand whether its conceptual conclusions 
rely on accounts of the historical development of the legal doctrine 
or practice. If they do, one must ask how they do, and whether a 
different historical account accords with, adds to, contradicts, 
subtends, or otherwise modifies the conceptual frameworks that 
have been based on narratives from which key histories have been 
effaced. 
B. The Challenge of Representation 
The connection between the pattern of omitting histories of 
conquest, slavery, and race from legal texts and the persistent 
legacies of the formal exclusions that were a part of those histo-
ries may already seem clear. However, there are many different 
problems of representation that stem from erasure—minorities’ 
contributions have been erased from historical records, but they 
have also historically experienced actual exclusion from institu-
tions. Both make members of minority groups and the particular 
obstacles they face invisible, but the tendency to conflate discur-
sive and material exclusions only exacerbates the erasure of their 
contributions—how they acted to shape law and legal practice, in 
addition to experiencing hardship because of it. This Section de-
scribes why it is essential to synthesize the kind of primary source 
research discussed in Part I, with the literature premised on eras-
ure discussed in Part II.A, and the rich existent literature in fed-
eral Indian law, legal history, and critical race studies that has 
focused on the experiences of minority groups and the legal chal-
lenges they have faced. The complementary and in some ways de-
rivative project of examining the impact of these histories on the 
law highlights again the importance of representation put for-
ward by this literature long ago: bringing omitted voices into con-
versations about institutions in which they were always involved, 
in order to understand more about those institutions, their hu-
man and other effects, and our collective world. 
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The literature on the ways laws have affected nonwhite 
groups because of conquest and slavery has been extensively es-
tablished by scholars of Native American history, federal Indian 
law, African American history, and legal history.154 That work ad-
dresses the segregated legal forms that applied specifically to 
nonwhites, including laws of Indian Affairs, later federal Indian 
law, as well as many iterations of Black Codes and the legal re-
gime of Jim Crow.155 In somewhat complicated ways, nonwhite 
groups have also long had restricted and limited access to the le-
gal venues and processes that white people used, though they 
were long excluded from lawmaking, judgment, and other pro-
cesses of institutional decisionmaking.156 Interracial transactions 
and commerce were ordinary, everyday, and indeed indispensa-
ble. Without it, for example, colonists could not have come into 
possession of most of the territory in their jurisdictions, which 
they boasted of acquiring by purchase; and many early techniques 
of commercial predation likely developed through such com-
merce.157 However, legal texts also helped cultivate racial stereo-
types that justified and facilitated conquest, slavery, and a range 
of forms of racial exclusion and predatory inclusion that consti-
tuted a part of these processes and exceeded them. A voluminous 
literature has amply described and documented how nonwhites 
served as malleable and peripheral figures in legal discourse 
 
 154 See generally, for example, Lisa Brooks, Our Beloved Kin (Yale 2018); Yasuhide 
Kawashima, Puritan Justice and the Indian: White Man’s Law in Massachusetts, 1630–
1763 (Wesleyan 1986); David E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Su-
preme Court: The Masking of Justice (Texas 1997); A. Leon Higginbotham Jr, In the Matter 
of Color: Race and the American Legal Process. The Colonial Period (Oxford 1978); Thomas 
D. Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619–1820 (North Carolina 1996). 
 155 See generally, for example, Walter R. Echo-Hawk, In the Courts of the Conqueror: 
The 10 Worst Indian Law Cases Ever Decided (Fulcrum 2010) (describing the legal mis-
carriages of justice Natives have suffered in US courts); Vanessa Holloway, Black Rights 
in the Reconstruction Era (Hamilton 2018) (explaining the limitations on African Ameri-
cans’ access to justice during the Reconstruction era). 
 156 See generally, for example, Vine Deloria Jr and Clifford M. Lytle, American Indi-
ans, American Justice (Texas 1983); Natalie J. Ring and Amy Louise Wood, eds, Crime 
and Punishment in the Jim Crow South (Illinois 2019). But see Melissa Milewski, From 
Slave to Litigant: African Americans in Court in the Postwar South, 1865-1920, 30 L & 
Hist Rev 723, 724 (2012), But see generally Lyle Koehler, Red-White Power Relations and 
Justice in the Courts of Seventeenth-Century New England, 3 Am Indian Culture & Rsrch 
J 1 (1979). 
 157 See generally Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power 
on the Frontier (Belknap 2005) (discussing US acquisition of Natives’ territory as a result 
of military conquest, consensual sales, and legal frameworks which ultimately privileged 
white ownership and definitions of property). See also note 122. 
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during colonization and slavery.158 Native and Black people re-
ceived whatever attributes helped to justify the violence colonists 
enacted upon them in order to extract value, in land or labor, from 
them: they became prehistoric, savage, criminal, or inhuman 
beasts, as the theory required.159 These stereotypes erased or min-
imized the humanity of nonwhite groups and profoundly shaped 
social relations. Consequently, colonial and US literature grew 
less inclined over time to recognize the extent to which nonwhite 
groups participated in the development of the colonies, the coun-
try, and the laws. Indeed, nonwhite groups helped colonial com-
munities survive by economically and politically transacting with 
white people, in addition to asserting their own humanity, free-
dom and habeas suits and political independence through negoti-
ations, treaties, and wars.160 
The persistence of ideas about nonwhite groups that erase 
their agency—historically and in the present—runs parallel to 
the complicity of legal institutions in racializing, subordinating, 
and extracting wealth from legal texts. Scholars of Native Amer-
ican history, federal Indian law, and the history of enslaved and 
freedpeople, both in and outside of the legal academy, have indeed 
addressed both sides of this problem—the resilience and develop-
ment of these groups as well as the specific laws and institutions 
that challenged their survival. In so doing, this literature has 
 
 158 The literature is too voluminous to attempt to summarize, but no one has more 
thoroughly accounted for the ways that Spanish, English, and Anglo-American legal dis-
courses fashioned the idea of “the Indian” as a foil for theories of conquest espoused by 
European sovereigns during the Age of Discovery than Robert A. Williams Jr in The Amer-
ican Indian in Western Legal Thought. See generally Robert A. Williams Jr, The American 
Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford 1990). A. Leon Hig-
ginbotham Jr’s In the Matter of Color is also exemplary. See generally Higginbotham Jr, 
In the Matter of Color (cited in note 154). For other classic titles exploring this issue in the 
colonial period, see generally Theodore W. Allen, The Invention of the White Race: Racial 
Oppression and Social Control (Verso 1994); Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: Amer-
ican Attitudes Towards the Negro, 1550–1812 (W.W. Norton 1977). 
 159 See, for example, Johnson, 21 US (8 Wheat) at 590 (“[T]he tribes of Indians inhab-
iting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence 
was drawn chiefly from the forest.”). 
 160 See, for example, Commonwealth v Aves, 35 Mass (18 Pick) 193 (1836) (adjudicat-
ing a habeas corpus suit brought by an enslaved person). See also John William Tebbel 
and Keith Warren Jennison, The American Indian Wars 1–146 (Harper 1960) (chronicling 
the military conquest of the United States in the colonial American Indian wars). See also 
generally Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anom-
aly (California 1994) (discussing the hundreds of treaties that were ratified between the 
United States and Native Nations from 1778 and 1868 and their unique situation in Amer-
ican history). 
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established a foundation for understanding the laws that struc-
tured conquest, slavery, and their aftermath, furnishing the basic 
tools necessary for inquiring about the impact of the histories of 
colonization and slavery. Thus, though those fields have been 
held as separate and nonessential to the study of the fundamental 
law subjects discussed above,161 scholarship that asks how the 
histories of subordination and extraction shaped the basic compo-
nents of our legal system is properly understood as an outgrowth 
of the literature that has placed its emphasis and centered its 
frames on marginalized groups.162 
The project of exploring the impact of these histories on the 
shape of the law therefore illuminates the inherent relationship 
between fields that have long been viewed as marginal and elec-
tive versus the core of the study of US law. Both work that focuses 
on affected groups and that which focuses on accounts of the law 
respond to and attempt to remediate historical patterns of eras-
ure. The social as well as political and economic legacies of formal 
exclusion have meant that integration and representation of mi-
nority groups in legal fields has increased slowly over time, but 
also that social barriers have outlived the barriers of formal legal 
exclusion.163 Early, prescient critiques that drew attention to the 
social consequences of erasure more than three decades ago also 
focused on the ways in which legal education and other factors 
marginalized the experiences and perspectives of women and mi-
nority students.164 Even without the information surfacing now 
 
 161 It is possible that this distinction came about in part because of—and may have 
found some justification in—the fact that sometimes material concerning nonwhites 
within a particular field of law or practice was located in different sources than material 
concerning transactions between white people. See Part I.B. 
 162 Though closely allied, these types of projects have distinguishable foci and aims as 
a result of their different frames. Work that explores the different challenges groups faced 
during colonization, slavery, and their aftermath more directly illuminates the reasoning 
and support for reparations and affirmative action policies, for example. Work that focuses 
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and reflect differences in degrees of pragmatism more than substantive commitment. 
 163 For an example of a recent work describing this dynamic in the context of housing, 
see Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real Estate Industry 
Undermined Black Homeownership 18–19 (UNC 2019) (describing the discriminatory na-
ture of the Federal Housing Administration program that extended mortgages to commu-
nities of color after decades of redlining and showing how discrimination can occur through 
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 164 See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal 
Education, 11 Natl Black L J 1, 9–10 (1988); Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models, 
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about the extent and mechanisms of erasure of race and histories 
of subordination in the main first-year subjects, Professors Kim-
berlé Crenshaw and Lani Guinier both described the alienation 
students felt in classrooms where the issues that they understood 
best and that most affected them did not appear in the curricu-
lum.165 Crenshaw commented that “[t]he racial dimensions of tra-
ditional law school subject areas are seldom discussed. On the few 
occasions when racial dimensions are considered the issues raised 
are either summarily addressed or mentioned only in passing.”166 
Guinier, speaking perhaps to her own sense of isolation on a 
faculty at the time, likewise spoke of the need for professors who 
could “acknowledge[ ] where appropriate the relevance of race or 
gender.”167 Both Guinier and Crenshaw observed the harmful ef-
fects of erasure on students who were expected to model a view of 
“perspectivelessness”168 in the classroom, “ignorant to differences 
of culture, gender and race.”169 As work on erasure and represen-
tation continues to grow, so do the dimensions of this critique: this 
year, Professor Blackhawk renewed Guinier and Crenshaw’s ob-
servations about the failure of the legal academy to confront its 
own erasures in a personal essay about confronting the invisibil-
ity of Native Nations and her experience as a Native person at 
Stanford Law School in the late 2000s.170 “One way that Native 
people combat the active erasure of Indian Country,” Blackhawk 
writes of the burden that individuals who experience erasure 
carry, “is to self-identify. In doing so, we put our bodies and our 
reputations between the force of erasure and the furtherance of 
the American colonial project.”171 
Of course, the way that students of color and women have felt 
their own experiences and perspectives rendered invisible and 
delegitimized through erasure in the classroom—erasure of their 
 
6 Berkeley Women’s L J 93, 93–97 (1990). See also Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race 
from Legal Education, 28 U Mich J L Ref 51, 67–80 (1994) (discussing the “color-blind” 
orientation of legal education and the pernicious effects that this orientation can have on 
Black students). 
 165 See Crenshaw, 11 Natl Black L J at 9–10 (cited in note 164); Guinier, 6 Berkeley 
Women’s L J at 93–97 (cited in note 164). 
 166 Crenshaw, 11 Natl Black L J at 9 (cited in note 164). 
 167 Guinier, 6 Berkeley Women’s L J at 104 (cited in note 164). 
 168 Crenshaw, 11 Natl Black L J at 2–3 (cited in note 164). 
 169 Guinier, 6 Berkeley Women’s L J at 93 (cited in note 164). 
 170 See generally Maggie Blackhawk, On Power & Indian Country, 1 Women & L 39 
(2020) (joint publication of the top sixteen law reviews). 
 171 Id at 43. 
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capacities, talents, and the histories from which they may de-
scend—requires no scholarly proof to be a matter of concern. In 
that sense, Crenshaw, Guinier, and Blackhawk all highlight what 
Purdy also focused on in his chapter on losing a country, albeit 
from an outside perspective—the serious affective dimensions of 
erasure that constitute an overlooked aspect of its social effects 
and challenges.172 The affective experiential challenges of erasure 
must be at least as profound as that of realizing the erasure of 
others’ experiences; and the attempt to counter erasures often re-
quires disrupting people’s affective attachments to frameworks 
and worldviews built upon them. 
What we learn from considering the familiar priorities of rep-
resentation and perspective as part of the question of historical 
erasure and its impact on the legal field and scholarship are some 
important lessons about precisely the problems that Purdy sets 
out as the topic of his book—the challenges of speaking across dif-
ferences to build a commons. The lessons (in reverse order of this 
Review’s discussion) are as follows: 1) individuals feel the harm 
of erasure and resistance to it on a deeply personal level, so that 
the attempt to communicate across chasms of presumptions often 
diverts to those feelings instead of to the underlying intellectual 
question; and 2) as a result of many sedimented layers that pro-
duce the erasure of specific histories at the root of these disagree-
ments, we lack a great deal of information that could inform our 
common understandings of the institutions that govern us at both 
a factual and conceptual level. A general presumption of erasure 
of the histories of conquest, slavery, and race in the main fields of 
law, such as those studied by first-years, would greatly facilitate 
the common project of understanding the common terms of their 
legacies. As part of this endeavor, revisiting the problem of per-
spective as central to inquiries about the composition of fields of 
law clarifies why representation must be central too. For it is the 
missing voices of the figures erased from our history—what they 
did as well as what happened to them—and the voices of the peo-
ple who care about them and resist their erasure (whether be-
cause they descend from them, or for other reasons, have not be-
lieved in their absence and pursue their stories) that make it 
possible to tell the story of how conquest, slavery, and their 
 
 172 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 55–75 (cited in note 1). See also text accompa-
nying notes 137–53. 
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aftermath produced our past and our present, both in legal insti-
tutions and outside of them. 
The structural importance of erasure also highlights some 
frequently overlooked aspects of the significance of representa-
tion. Extending the questions of perspective and representation 
historically often reveals new information about the ways that 
minorities used, changed, and shaped the law. Understanding 
how our legal system grew out of the histories of conquest and 
slavery does not merely mean recovering the histories of the vio-
lence they enacted, facilitated, and legitimated. While Purdy 
acknowledges the violence of racist representations,173 his account 
could more deeply engage with what representation means be-
yond acknowledging violence and unevenly distributed harm. 
Early in the book, he suggests that “our civic enmity”174 
is a matter of some people starting to see what many others 
have known for a long time: that, depending on who you are, 
the police are dangerous, the courthouse is a menace, the of-
ficial statues are civic graffiti and insults; that la migra, ICE, 
will grab and expel with one American hand the same migrants 
that the other hand, the economic sectors of building and clean-
ing and harvesting, has been beckoning and exploiting.175 
In keeping with this summary, the nonwhites who he names 
mostly suffer and absorb the violence of racism in his text:176 Sam-
uel Oliver-Bruno is arrested;177 Professor Pauli Murray suffered 
 
 173 “Settlers,” Purdy asserts in his introduction, “made indigenous Americans into a 
kind of narrative resource, a flexible key to imagining ways of being ‘the land’s.’” Purdy, 
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multiple forms of oppression as a child in the Jim Crow South;178 
and Anthony Burns is re-enslaved.179 Before his eventual depor-
tation, however, Oliver-Bruno lived in a church for almost a year 
as possibly the most famous figurehead of the recent revival of 
the sanctuary church movement.180 Murray, among other accom-
plishments, supplied arguments that Justices Thurgood Marshall 
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg drew upon for landmark cases that 
transformed US law in the twentieth century.181 Burns was a 
preacher who eventually obtained freedom and left some record 
of his thoughts.182 After his removal under the Fugitive Slave Act 
from Boston, which provoked massive protests,183 Burns was im-
prisoned in Richmond, which permanently damaged his health, 
and then sold to a North Carolina slave trader.184 In 1855, a group 
of Boston African Americans led by Leonard Grimes purchased 
his freedom for $1,300.185 Burns studied theology at Oberlin, drew 
on his experiences to campaign against slavery in New England, 
and moved to preach in Baptist churches in Indianapolis and then 
Saint Catharines, Upper Canada, where he died in 1862, at only 
twenty-eight years of age.186 
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Of course, highlighting historical racial violence is crucial for 
many reasons. We must grapple with the human costs of our in-
stitutions, the extent of which we are still uncovering and learn-
ing. A clear-eyed look at past institutional development sheds 
light on the logic and dynamics of institutions, systems, and prac-
tices that continue to operate in the present. However, even dur-
ing the periods most famous for racial violence, such as the land 
grabs of the eighteenth century, the antebellum period, and Jim 
Crow, nonwhites survived those challenges and acted in ways 
that shaped the world. They engaged with those systems in ordi-
nary, inventive, and subversive ways, participated in them as 
they could to gain advantages, and challenged them directly, in-
dividually and en masse.187 All of this activity both shaped our in-
stitutions and furnishes rich lessons about human resiliency, the 
kinds of incentives institutions can create that foster or hamper 
collective action and life, the strength of communities and their 
traditions, and the structural limitations of institutions we have 
built. 
The absence of people of color from narratives in which they 
acted therefore reinforces the erasure of their humanity and ca-
pacities; this is the legacy of both formal exclusions and harmful 
stereotyping. In his chapter “The Long Environmental Justice 
Movement,”188 Purdy describes “the history of environmentalism,” 
as “a microcosm of American history generally.” Yet, what he 
means by that claim is especially perplexing with respect to the 
question of representation.189 Purdy structures the essay as an 
address to the environmental justice movement’s critique that 
mainstream environmental law organizations did not adequately 
attend to questions of distribution, or the disproportionate impact 
of environmental harms on nonwhite and poor people.190 Racism 
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appears to be its principal topic, and Purdy goes into relatively 
extensive detail to name and describe the vitriolic racism of sev-
eral early environmentalists, including Madison Grant, President 
Theodore Roosevelt, Irving Fisher, Governor Gifford Pinchot, and 
John Muir.191 He then describes the beginning of the mainstream 
environmental law movement, including the Sierra Club mem-
bership’s negative response to a poll asking if the Club should 
concern itself with “the urban poor and ethnic minorities.”192 He 
does relate that “[i]n 1987, the United Church of Christ’s (UCC) 
Commission for Racial Justice published an influential report 
that . . . called th[e] unequal vulnerability [of minority communi-
ties to toxic exposure] ‘a form of racism.’” 193 
Yet Purdy never mentions the great grassroots movements of 
black communities, led by Dollie Burwell and Reverends Leon 
White and Benjamin Chavis Jr, nor the UCC—which was also led 
by Black women, Reverends Adora Iris Lee and Bernice Powell 
Jackson—the organization that ultimately produced this re-
port.194 It would be equally difficult to know that it was this mass 
movement of people of color who named their struggle “environ-
mental justice” and popularized the term. This movement gath-
ered in 1991 for the First National People of Color Environmental 
Leadership Summit in Washington, DC, which produced a 
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visionary document outlining a series of “principles of environ-
mental justice.”195 Under the leadership of the Congressional 
Black Caucus, in 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) established the Environmental Equity Workgroup.196 In 
1992 and 1993, the EPA formed the Office of Environmental Eq-
uity and the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, 
respectively.197 And in 1994, President Bill Clinton renamed the 
office as the Office of Environmental Justice and issued an exec-
utive order creating an Interagency Working Group on Environ-
mental Justice and requiring that each federal agency “make 
achieving environmental justice part of its mission.”198 In other 
words, grassroots movements of communities of color, led mostly 
by Black women and men, thereby succeeded in making environ-
mental justice a federal agenda item. As an outsider to the field, 
one of the most striking things about the extensive literature on 
the environmental justice movement is its clear pride in memori-
alizing the landmarks of its history, the diverse coalitions it built 
across the country, and its leaders, including Professor Robert 
Bullard—sometimes called the father of the environmental jus-
tice movement—and especially women leaders, such as Peggy 
Shepard, Margie Eugene Richard, Professor Beverley Wright, 
and many more.199 
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It is difficult to guess why none of this history appears in 
Purdy’s account of the environmental justice movement, espe-
cially given the concerns he repeatedly expresses about structural 
racism, perspective, and erasure. Instead, pivoting from his spe-
cific descriptions of early environmentalists’ racism (which appar-
ently inspired both Adolf Hitler and an anti-immigrant killer of 
sixty-nine young Labour party members in Norway in 2011),200 
Purdy swiftly declares that “there is another history of environ-
mentalism” that can prevent us from being “trapped by our his-
tory of self-division.”201 The alternative genealogy he then offers 
is another series of early white environmentalists who did not ad-
vocate for race science and genocide;202 instead, they gave some 
consideration to cities, factory workers, and chemicals. One man, 
Robert Marshall, even participated in “reforms that increased the 
sovereignty and cultural autonomy of Native American na-
tions.”203 Purdy finally returns to the environmental justice move-
ment’s criticisms of major environmental law institutions, to de-
clare that “[l]eaving out distribution” was a mistake made in 
“good faith,” because in the early 1970s, those organizations had 
good reason to believe that the world would only grow more 
equal.204 In “this time of fresh mobilization and new alliance,” he 
reclaims the term “environmental justice movement” for a “long” 
movement that has grown from the genealogy he has described.205 
In closing, Purdy notes that “[e]conomic power, racial inequality, 
and the struggles of Indigenous peoples are not optional or sup-
plemental. They are at the heart of the work. They have always 
been.”206 Yet nowhere does he engage with the rich literature by 
Indigenous writers, who have not only ensured the survival of 
their own histories of struggle, but also offer the fullest, most 
deeply developed accounts that we have of how to relate to the 
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land and one another beyond the framework of property and the 
market.207 
Admittedly, a number of movements working for environ-
mental justice predate and exceed this specific, well-known move-
ment that popularized the term, as its own members and chroni-
clers concede. In the 1960s, for example, César Chávez organized 
Mexican farmworkers in California not only to improve working 
conditions, but also to combat pesticide abuse.208 “The struggles 
of indigenous peoples,” too, have indeed been at the heart of the 
environmental justice movement for centuries, but at their heart 
have also always been Indigenous leaders, and especially women 
and youth, who all too frequently go unnamed and unrecognized 
by people outside of their own communities. Some are nonetheless 
well-known: the Zapatistas have been waging one of the most vis-
ible Indigenous resistances to toxic development in the world 
since the 1990s;209 the Ojibwe environmentalist Winona LaDuke 
founded Honor the Earth, a national advocacy group encouraging 
public support and funding for Native environmental groups in 
1993;210 and Ken Saro-Wiwa and, more recently, Berta Cáceres 
famously lost their lives leading struggles for environmental jus-
tice.211 In his book, Purdy mentions Standing Rock and Bears 
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Ears more than once, but in disembodied ways.212 Yet Standing 
Rock youth initiated the NoDAPL direct action protests;213 La-
Donna Brave Bull Allard and Joye Braun of the Indigenous Envi-
ronmental Network then established the water protectors’ 
camp,214 while David Archambault II led the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe through that period.215 In July 2015, leaders from the Hopi 
Tribe, Navajo Nation, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Pueblo of Zuni, 
and Ute Indian Tribe formed the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coali-
tion to protect the sacred, spiritual, historical, natural, scientific 
and cultural resources of the lands.216 That coalition and the non-
profit Utah Diné Bikéyah have been fighting against Trump’s re-
duction of the monument.217 
Purdy’s call to include everyone under the umbrella of “envi-
ronmental justice” is an impetus and ethic that these groups and 
individuals already share. They have, of course, their own gene-
alogies of environmental justice predecessors, so it is not clear if 
Purdy means to offer them an alternative, or to add the lineage 
he constructs to theirs. Certainly the genealogy he constructs 
here, on its own, feels out of sync with a youth-led environmental 
movement that is rising globally. While this movement’s most fa-
mous face may be Greta Thunberg’s, it is constituted overwhelm-
ingly by Indigenous youth and youth of color,218 who are more 
likely to find their inheritances and inspiration in the long lega-
cies and resilience of Indigenous people and people of color who 
have defended their communities and the Earth. 
Those youth would likely notice, too, if they read his book, 
that though Purdy frequently refers to racism, erasure, and the 
disproportionate harms borne by communities of color throughout 
his book, and though people of color organized and led many of 
 
 212 See, for example, Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 4–6, 23 (cited in note 1) (dis-
cussing Bears Ears); id at 102–03 (discussing the Dakota Access Pipeline). 
 213 Matt Petronzio, How Young Native Americans Built and Sustained the #NoDAPL 
Movement (Mashable, Dec 7, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/29FB-V536. 
 214 Rebecca Bengal, Standing Rock Rising: Inside the Movement to Stop the Dakota 
Access Pipeline (Vogue, Nov 22, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/Y45N-34J4. 
 215 Sam Levin, Standing Rock Chairman Looks to History as Divisions Emerge Among 
Activists (The Guardian, Feb 13, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/9PLJ-A2WT. 
 216 Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition, Who We Are, archived at 
https://perma.cc/M6UR-2RJ5. 
 217 See Zak Podmore, Native Americans Win Elections in Utah After Voicing Support 
for Bears Ears (Sierra, Nov 15, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/5MVJ-MFX5. 
 218 See Maia Wikler and Thanu Yakupitiyage, 11 Young Climate Justice Activists You 
Need to Pay Attention To (Vice, Oct 1, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/482V-J3SZ. 
2024 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1977 
 
the movements and issues that he describes, the number of people 
of color he names does not exceed the fingers on my two hands, 
and includes no Indigenous people. The few named individuals 
who act in the text, rather than just suffer, are some of the most 
visible people of color in the world—President Barack Obama, 
Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Reverend Jesse Jack-
son, and Ta-Nehisi Coates.219 Perhaps Purdy is neither speaking 
to those youth nor to the people who are not reflected in his ac-
counts of the movements he describes. Perhaps his audience is 
the community of people, like him, who felt they lost their coun-
try; who have recently felt the disorientation of their own limited 
perspective; who he worries will turn to cynicism and nihilism 
from that emotional disturbance instead of a collective, common 
cause. Perhaps his audience is a group of people he hopes to bring 
into a broader movement, not those who are already inside of one, 
building and leading it. 
Purdy’s appreciation of the total, affective, and embodied na-
ture of perspective also illuminates why speaking across different 
perspectives, built on different understandings of the world, often 
presents such an insoluble challenge. Yet similarly, recognizing 
the limits of one’s own perspective, and that others who experi-
ence erasure also have perspectives, are perhaps the necessary 
requisites for engaging substantively in conversations one has 
never had before. Engaging with critical race studies scholarship, 
which long ago described the holistic importance of representa-
tion,220 might have inspired Purdy to describe and also show his 
audience how the contributions of the nonwhite individuals that 
both appear and are subsumed in his book shaped the world that 
he describes. An engagement with the literatures on the history 
of conquest and slavery might have made the term “Common-
wealth” feel too drenched in the history of the British Empire—
and in an English era that saw the consolidation of its colonial 
enterprises in America and the creation of the Royal African Com-
pany—to serve as a banner term for movements led by Indigenous 
peoples and the descendants of the enslaved. An engagement with 
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Indigenous scholars would have clarified that Indigenous claims 
to political sovereignty and their traditional homelands remain 
unmistakable and unbroken, and revealed how much the claim 
that “this land is our land,” however innocently offered, appears 
as an affront to those claims. 
Purdy’s sense of a possessory interest in land is not a narrow, 
individual one—but neither does it defer to Indigenous claims or 
reflect Indigenous concepts. This absence is curious because 
Purdy’s vision of the commons, leaving aside his genealogies, res-
onates strongly in many ways with Indigenous philosophies, 
teachings, and writings, with which he does not engage but from 
which he could draw insight and begin to build real relations. 
Potawatami scholar and scientist Robin Wall Kimmerer, for ex-
ample, uses the Haudenosaunee idea of “One Bowl and One 
Spoon,” which teaches that “the gifts of the earth are all in one 
bowl, all to be shared from a single spoon”; according to this 
worldview, earth “exists not as private property, but as a com-
mons, to be tended with respect and reciprocity for the benefit of 
all.”221 As a starting point, in light of Indigenous claims and con-
cepts, as a non-Indigenous person, the conversation must begin 
precisely with the recognition that this land is not our land. While 
the hundreds of different Native Nations in America hold differ-
ent mythologies about the land and different traditions of land 
tenure, there is a common baseline, which LaDuke captures when 
she writes: “It is not our land. It is the land to which we belong.”222 
The value of representation is not the tokenistic inclusion or 
acknowledgment of different bodies, but rather, beginning a rela-
tionship in which these bodies might listen to and learn from one 
another. In legal scholarship, the challenge of working in the 
space of erasure is to integrate literatures containing erasures 
with the works that offer the stories that literature does not con-
tain. The importance of representation—of different types of 
sources, containing different perspectives—lies in the possibility 
of a true exchange and growth from that exchange. Tonawanda 
Band of Seneca scholar Mishuana Goeman recently reflected on 
the difference between a limited “acknowledgment” and ap-
proaching this richer, more substantive relationship in the 
 
 221 Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass 376 (Milkweed 2013) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 222 Winona LaDuke, The Winona LaDuke Reader: A Collection of Essential Writings 
147 (Voyageur 2002). 
2026 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1977 
 
context of tribal land acknowledgments, writing: “Perhaps we 
should not . . . understand[ ] these processes of stating whose 
lands you are on as a land acknowledgement but think of a place-
based, community consulted understanding of whose land we are 
on as a Land introduction. That leaves [open] so many relations 
and places to grow.”223 
The goal of building our fractured narratives into a place of 
exchange and mutual respect is indeed an urgent one, in which 
many people, coming from different perspectives, and in their own 
ways, are working to tend. The work of difficult conversations is 
the work of cultivating the commons of Purdy’s dreams. In that 
respect, his account feels like an accurate index of the many ways 
in which that conversation has begun and progressed, and also, 
of the space where it has room, in our current moment, in Goe-
man’s positive framing, to grow. 
CONCLUSION 
This Book Review has proceeded in the spirit of Professor 
Purdy’s exhortation to shoulder the challenge of building unity at 
a time when the grim consequences of denying our interconnect-
edness are visible in stark relief and quickly magnifying across 
the globe. In taking up this work, it agrees with Purdy that be-
ginning with the history of the nation and the land on which we 
reside—the great violence and the erasure of that history—is key 
to understanding that challenge and each other. It parts ways 
with Purdy where it perceives that here, with his proclamation 
that “this land is our land” and his call for a “commonwealth,” he 
replicates a specific failure to practice real inclusion within a uni-
versalizing vision that has perennially plagued left/liberal move-
ments and hampered their ability to build effective coalitions. In 
order to bring people together, acknowledging their diverse expe-
riences should be the beginning of a process of learning from ex-
periences outside one’s own, and being willing to rethink even the 
norms and ideals that one holds most dear. Because people have 
not had the same experiences, the challenges of this conversation 
are not the same for everyone. The task for someone used to hav-
ing a voice is not to solve the problem of how to speak for people 
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accustomed to having their histories and perspectives erased; it 
is to learn to listen and to hold a true dialogue with them. Insofar 
as that conversation concerns the particular histories of the land 
and the law that shape our lives in common, there is much left for 
all of us to learn, and it is imperative that we do it together. 
This Review has therefore also reflected on the related and 
particular task of building legal scholarship from suppressed his-
torical foundations: understanding the ramifications of the histo-
ries of conquest and slavery for law and legal scholarship is an 
ongoing and incomplete process, one that requires enormous and 
particular labor that is not widely or well understood. Scholarship 
on erasures so far suggests that they are ubiquitous across doc-
trinal fields, and it offers a more precise understanding of the 
mechanisms by which they occur. Taking erasure as an object of 
scholarly inquiry is challenging in many ways, and obliges us to 
consider a different approach to methodology and the idea of a 
field: it is hard to find the stories we have lost because it is almost 
impossible to know when a positive representation of facts con-
tains an erasure, or that an archive could represent only one set 
of experiences with a part of the law, and where else other infor-
mation, if it exists, is to be found. Furthermore, curing erasure 
means researching buried stories, but also coming to understand 
that the conventions of one’s canons and the ideals that may 
structure one’s political imagination may also be limited by the 
failure to appreciate other experiences and other perspectives, 
whether because the stories have been inaccessible or because 
traditional institutional practices have cast them as peripheral, 
unimportant, and invisible. Nonetheless, the traces of erasure, its 
symptoms and patterns, are also everywhere. 
The work of understanding the significance of historical eras-
ure from the study of law requires putting stories from the archive 
into conversation with the theoretical frameworks that omitted 
them and the scholarship that furnishes the intersecting histories 
and theoretical frameworks that help explain them. This work of 
synthesis presents the process of reaching a collective under-
standing of the history of our institutions, the positive constitu-
tion of our legal systems, and our social world. These observations 
proceed in the spirit of Purdy’s effort to build common ground on 
which to reach a collective understanding of how we arrived in 
the riven present. The rising volume of the conversation about 
these histories outside of the legal academy means that legal 
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scholars who take up this challenge come into dialogue in new 
ways not only with one another but also with the public. If we do 
not, the rifts between that public and the legal academy—as well 
as the parts of the legal academy that reference increasingly dif-
ferent versions of American history in their teaching and scholar-
ship—will widen. 
This Review calls for a general presumption of erasure that 
would put us on notice that accepted accounts of the law that bear 
no trace of the foundational histories of conquest, slavery, and the 
deeply racialized transactional world that followed in their wake 
may represent conclusions drawn from an incomplete record. We 
should further reexamine the conceptual norms, ideals, and prac-
tical conventions that emerged from incomplete, whitewashed 
narratives about the historical development of American law. 
These conventional norms and ideals that appear “raceless” have 
spread beyond the parts of legal scholarship, teaching, and prac-
tice that focus on historical research. At the same time, the racism 
that stems from these histories, in ways that we continue to learn 
more about, remains rife in these spheres in many dimensions. 
We fail to perceive the connection between segregation in think-
ing and in our communities at our peril—once more, at the cost of 
understanding the institutions that govern us and how we might 
remake them. Because law and legal thinking have helped shape 
the world we live in, the legacies of these omissions hold signifi-
cant stakes for people everywhere; their stakes are epistemologi-
cal, scholarly, material, and practical, all at once. One of the 
greatest rewards, as well as challenges, of articulating the signif-
icance of these histories to law in ways that might channel new 
insights into effective collective action toward the goal of trans-
formative change. 
